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Abstract
In order to examine whether Chinese employers discriminated against females during the
hiring process in 1996 and 2005, we used the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS)
questionnaire (1997 data, pooled data of 2004 and 2006) by referring to Johnson (1983) and
Mohanty (1998). Empirical results of the 1996 sample reveal that male workers generally
receive less favorable treatment and consequently enjoy a lower average employment
probability than female workers. However, approximately a decade after the enactment of the
labor law, the 2005 sample shows that male workers generally enjoy preferential treatment
over female workers with otherwise identical worker characteristics. Our empirical results
suggest that an increase in the education level of females, in the employment probability of
females aged 25 and younger, and in the employment probability of females working in the
government sector may prove effective in eliminating employment discrimination between
males and females.
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1. Introduction 
 
A woman is afforded equal rights with a man in employment. … 
(Labour Law
1, 1994, Article 13) 
 
After 1949, the Chinese government adopted a bureaucratic system of administering 
wages and allocating labor. Since 1957, the state exercised a virtual monopoly over the 
allocation of urban labor. It was the plan, and not labor market, that governed labor supply 
and demand. The labor “requirements” of each enterprise were based on the plan, which 
was adjusted to avoid urban unemployment. Reform of the urban labor system began in 
1980, when the state monopoly of labor allocation was replaced by a fairly more 
decentralized one. Labor exchanges were set up for the registration of job vacancies, most 
job placements, and training. In the 1990s, the planning quota for recruitment by state 
enterprises was abolished, and enterprises were allowed to choose their own employees. 
The state no longer took responsibility for matching the supply of and demand for labor. In 
principle, this should have made the labor market more flexible. Moreover, the government 
decided to steer state enterprises into the market, holding them responsible for their losses 
even to the point of bankruptcy. Until 1995, the state sector was still dominant, and a 
combination of retraining and attrition managed to keep open unemployment low.
2 
State enterprise reform gained momentum in the mid-1990s, and major surplus labors 
were ostracized from state and collective enterprises. Labor supply exceeded labor demand 
in the labor market (Wu and Li, 2006). As shown in Figure 1, in 1994, the total 
employment, male employment, and female employment in urban units were 152,585,000, 
94,594,000, and 57,991,000 persons, respectively. However, in 2005, these figures dropped 
to 114,040,000, 70,794,000, and 43,246,000 persons, respectively. The share of female 
employment is maintained by an approximate 38%. One of the reasons that the share of 
female employment is lesser than that of male employment is that labor force participation 
of females is lower than that of males (Cai et al., 2005). Another probable reason could be 
related to employee demand, that is, employers could discriminate against females during 
recruitment. According to the China Employment Discrimination Survey Questionnaire 
Report,
3 85.5% responded “yes,” when asked “Is there employment discrimination in 
current labor market?” Moreover,  50.8% responded “very serious” to the same question. 
On the other hand, while it was inquired “whether or not the enterprise or employer put 
forward gender-based employment restrictions,” respondents said that 13.9% of the cases 
specified “males only,” while 7.1% of the cases specified “females only.” However, a 
detailed and more precise analysis of employment discrimination among males and females 
                                                   
1  The labor law was promulgated in 1994 and put into effect in 1995. 
2 The details reported in this paragraph draw on various sources, primarily, Shirk (1981), White 
(1988), and Knight and Song (2003). 
3  The survey was conducted by the China University of Political Science and Law (CUPL) in 2006; 
it included 3,454 questionnaires and covered 10 cities, namely, Beijing, Guangzhou, Nanjing, 
Wuhan, Shenyang, Sian, Chengdu, Zhengzhou, Yinchuan, and Qingdao.   
Source: http://www.eeo.com.cn/eeo/jjgcb/2007/07/02/73823.html   2
in the Chinese labor market is required. 
          An employer can discriminate against a worker at various stages of employment, for 
instance, during the hiring process, in the payment of wages, with regard to promotion, etc. 
Wage discrimination refers to a difference in the earnings of two identical workers. Several 
studies have demonstrated gender discrimination in the payment of wages (Oaxaca, 1973; 
Blau and Beller, 1988; Olian et al., 1988; Gill, 1989; Hersch, 1991).   
Employment discrimination refers to disparities in employment probabilities resulting 
from the prejudices of employers. If an employer is prejudiced against non-whites, for 
example, then non-white workers are less likely to be hired than otherwise identical white 
workers (Abowd and Killingsworth, 1984). When differences in employment probabilities 
between two groups of workers cannot be explained by observable characteristics, there 
may be employment discrimination in the labor market. Several studies have examined the 
presence of employment discrimination in the US labor market, using unexplained 
employment probability differential as an indicator (Johnson, 1983; Abowd and 
Killingsworth, 1984; Mohanty, 1998, 2000).   
Several studies have analyzed gender wage differential and discrimination in the 
Chinese labor market (Liu et al., 2000; Mason et al., 2000; Meng, 1998). Others have 
analyzed wage discrimination between urban residents and rural migrants in China (Meng 
and Zhang, 2001; Wang and Zuo, 1999; Zhao, 2000). To our knowledge, however, there 
have been no earlier analyses of employment discrimination among males and females in 
the Chinese labor market.   
This study focuses on hiring discrimination. The next section introduces the 
procedures used for our estimations. Section 3 presents the data and the definitions of 




2. Empirical Techniques 
 
In this section, we briefly summarize the procedure for estimating the worker’s 
employment probability by referring to Johnson (1983) and Mohanty (1998). Let  t y  
denote the employer’s preference for the t-th worker, and let  t X   be a set of variables 
describing the worker’s characteristics and the aggregate employment situation in the labor 
market. Then, we have the following relationship: 
 
, tt t yX u β =+                 T t , , 2 , 1 … = ,                  (1)   
              
where  β   is a vector of unknown coefficients, and  t u   is the error term. It is assumed that 
the error term has a standard normal distribution.
4 The t-th worker in the labor force is 
employed (i.e.,  1 = t EMP ), if  0 > t y ; and unemployed (i.e.,  0 t EMP = ), if  0 t y ≤ . Thus, 
                                                   
4  Assumptions of unit variance are typically made in probit analysis to avoid estimating parameters 
to a scalar proportion.   3
we have   
 




== ≤= − > Pr( 0) Pr( 0) 1 Pr( 0) tt t EMP y y .                        ( 3 )  
 
Then, we can rewrite the employment probability in equation (2) as follows: 
 
Pr( 1) ( ) tt EMP X β == Φ ,                                    ( 4 )  
 
where  Φ denotes the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal distribution 
（Cameron and Trivedi, 2005）. We estimate the vector of unknown parameters  β  using 
the maximum likelihood method.   
Let  d EMP P ) ( be the worker’s employment probability in the presence of 
discrimination, and let  nd EMP P ) (  be  the  worker’s  employment probability in the absence 
of discrimination. Thus, we define the indicator of employment discrimination (D) as 
follows: 
 
nd d EMP P EMP P D ) ( ) ( − = .                               (5) 
 
Equation (5) shows the unexplained differential between the probability with discrimination 
and the probability without discrimination.   
Using the residual difference approach given by Oaxaca (1973) and Johnson (1983), 
we obtain two alternative indicators of employment discrimination based on two different 
no-discrimination coefficient vectors as follows: 
 




t X X D β β Φ − Φ =                           ( 6 )  
 




t X X D β β Φ − Φ = ,                            ( 7 )  
where  Φ denotes the average employment probability of all workers in the sample. In 
equations (6) and (7), the superscripts M  and  F  denote male workers and female 
workers, respectively. Equation (6) indicates that D1 measures the unexplained differences 
in male and female employment rates, when 
F β ˆ   are used as no-discrimination 
coefficients. Equation (7) indicates that D2 measures the unexplained differences in male 
and female employment rates, when 
M β ˆ  are used as no-discrimination coefficients. If a 
positive value for  j D , that is, ( j = 1, 2) is obtained with statistical significance, then it is   4






This paper uses the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS)
6 questionnaire data 
(1997, 2004 and 2006
7) to examine whether Chinese employers discriminate against 
females during the hiring process. The year 1996 was the next year that the labor law was 
put in force, and state enterprise reform gained momentum. On the other hand, around a 
decade later, the labor supply exceeded labor demand in the labor market, and China 
jointed the WTO. Through our study, we wish to find out whether Chinese employers 
discriminated against females during the hiring process in the year 2005. In the 1997 CHNS, 
questionnaires were distributed in the provinces of Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Shandong, 
Guizhou, Guangxi, Hubei, Henan, and Hunan (16 cities with 128 neighborhoods, and 32 
counties with 256 villages); whereas, in the CHNS of 2004 and 2006, nine provinces were 
included, and Liaoning was superadded (18 cities with 216 neighborhoods, and 36 counties 
with 432 villages). However, the data used in this paper are taken from the urban household 
data only.   
In order to examine the problem of employment discrimination among males and 
females, we drew samples that comprised only employed workers and unemployed workers, 
who were actively seeking employment. In accordance with the standard practice, we 
excluded employers, self-employed individuals, retirees, students, and household workers 
from the analysis. We also excluded all persons aged 15 or younger (China’s labor law sets 
the minimum working age as 16), as well as respondents who provided incomplete 
individual information or household composition. After the exclusions, the 1996 sample 
comprised 1,287 employed workers (697 men and 590 women) and 94 unemployed 
workers actively seeking employment (55 men and 39 women). On the other hand, the 
2003 and 2005 sample comprised 2,422 employed workers (1,419 men and 1,003 women) 
and 460 unemployed workers actively seeking employment (253 men and 207 women), 
between the ages of 16 (the school leaving age) and 55 (state retirement age for women) or 
60 (state retirement age for men).   
The explanatory variables used in the hiring equations include those related to the 
worker’s human capital characteristics (such as years of schooling completed, GRADE
8; 
                                                   
5 This should not, however, be interpreted as a measure of discrimination, as part of it may be 
attributable to other unmeasured characteristics (Blau and Beller, 1988). 
6 Source:  http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/china
 
7  The 2003 and 2005 data are pooled for our analysis; moreover, we convert the income in 2003 
into the income in 2005, taking into consideration the price increase or decrease of each province. 
8 The survey includes the following question: “How many years of formal education have you 
completed in a regular school?” Based on methodologies from other studies, we assign these years 
as follows: master’s degree or higher (19 years), 4 years of college/university (16 years), 3 years of 
college/university (15 years), 2 years of college/university (14 years), 1 year of college/university 
(13 years); 3 years of technical school or upper middle school (12 years), 2 years of technical school   5
experience,  EXP; age, YOUNG;  and marital status, MARRIED) and family income 
(FAMINC) as well as other variables (such as region of residence, EAST; and location of 
residence, CNTRCITY).  
     As shown in Figure 1, the employment percentage in the government sector and the 
employment percentage in the service sector in urban units decrease and increase, 
respectively. That is, the two variables that represent the macro-economical situation may 
influence the employer’s hiring decision as well as the yearly unemployment rate. 
Consequently, the province employment percentage in the government sector (GOVPCT), 
the province employment percentage in the service sector (SERVPCT), and the city 
registration unemployment rate of each province (URATE) are included in the hiring 
equations of the cross-section data of 1996 and 2005. The province-level URATE of 1996 
was obtained from the China Labour Statistical Yearbook 1997, and the other aggregate 
variables were obtained from the China Statistical Yearbook 1997. On the other hand, the 
province-level data on these aggregate variables for 2003 and 2005 were obtained from the 
China Statistical Yearbook 2004 and 2006, respectively. 
  We have provided the definitions, means, and standard deviations of these variables 
in Tables 1 and 2. 
 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
Table 3 presents the parameter estimates of employment probability equations for the 
male and female workers, based on the 1996 sample and the 2003 and 2005 pooled sample. 
The average employment probabilities (presented in Table 4) are obtained on computing 
individual probabilities for all workers in the sample by the use of relevant variables and 
coefficients.  
The estimated average male and female employment probabilities are provided in the 
first two columns of Table 4. The average employment probability of male workers 
) (
F M X β Φ   can be obtained (presented in column iii) using coefficients obtained from the 
hiring equations obtained from the female sample. When using coefficients obtained from 
hiring equations obtained from the male sample, the average employment probability of 
female workers  ) (
M F X β Φ are shown in column iv. 
When the value of column i  ) (
M M X β Φ  is smaller than that of column iii 
) (
F M X β Φ , it indicates an increase in the employment probability of males, by using the 
coefficients obtained from the hiring equation of the 1996 female sample. Similarly, when 
the value of column ii  ) (
F F X β Φ   is larger than that of column iv  ) (
M F X β Φ , it indicates 
a decrease in the employment probability of females, by using the coefficients obtained 
                                                                                                                                                            
or upper middle school (11 years), 1 year of technical school or upper middle school (10 years); 3 
years of lower middle school (9 years), 2 years of lower middle school (8 years), 1 year of lower 
middle school (7 years); 6 years of primary school (6 years), 5 years of primary school (5 years), 4 
years of primary school (4 years), 3 years of primary school (3 years), 2 years of primary school and 
lower (2 years).     6
from the hiring equation of the 1996 male sample. The male employment probability 
increases by about 2.2% when male workers are treated in a manner similar to that of 
female workers. Conversely, the employment probability of female workers decreases by 
about 1.8% when the female workers are treated in a manner similar to that of male 
workers. 
However, the results are converse in the 2005 sample. When the value of column i 
) (
M M X β Φ  is larger than that of column iii  ) (
F M X β Φ , it indicates a decrease in the 
employment probability of males, by using the coefficients obtained from the hiring 
equation of the 2005 female sample. Similarly, when the value of column ii  ) (
F F X β Φ  is 
smaller than that of column iv  ) (
M F X β Φ , it indicates an increase in the employment 
probability of females, by using the coefficients obtained from the hiring equation of the 
2005 male sample. The male employment probability decreases by about 3.2% when male 
workers are treated in a manner similar to that of female workers. Conversely, the 
employment probability of female workers increases by about 4.0% when the female 
workers are treated in a manner similar to that of male workers. 
When both  1 D  and  2 D , defined in equations (5) and (6), have the same sign with 
statistical significance,    employment discrimination may be present in the labor market. A 
positive and significant  1 D  denotes that male workers benefit from favoritism when the 
coefficient vector of females, 
F β , is considered discrimination-free. Since  1 D   in the first 
column of Table 5 is around –0.02 and significant, this result indicates that male workers 
generally receive less favorable treatment and consequently enjoy a lower average 
employment probability (in other words, they suffer from higher unemployment) than they 
would if they were treated in a manner similar to that of female workers in the 1996 sample. 
However, the converse result, in which 1 D  in the third column of Table 5 is around 0.03 
and significant, shows that male workers generally enjoy preferential treatment over female 
workers with otherwise identical worker characteristics in the 2005 sample. Similarly, a 
positive and significant  2 D  suggests that the employers have a prejudice against female 
workers when the coefficient vector of males, 
M β ,  is considered discrimination-free. 
Since  2 D  in the second column of Table 5 is around –0.02 and significant, this result 
indicates that female workers generally receive higher favorable treatment and 
consequently enjoy a higher average employment probability than they would if they were 
treated in a manner similar to that of male workers in the 1996 sample. On the other hand, 
the converse result, in which 2 D  in the fourth column of Table 5 is about 0.04 and 
significant, suggests that female workers generally receive less favorable treatment and 
consequently enjoy a lower average employment probability (in other words, they suffer 
from higher unemployment) than they would if they were treated in a manner similar to that 
of male workers in the 2005 sample.   
In order to explain how the employment probabilities of male and female workers 
change in response to changes in relevant independent variables, we will use the partial 
derivatives of the employment probability as the relevant independent variables (presented 
in Table 6).     7
The positive impact of GRADE on the worker’s employment probability in all 
samples indicates the employer’s preference for workers having a higher education level. 
As shown in Table 6, if the education level increases by one year, the employment 
probability of males increases by about 3.0%; however, the employment probability of 
females was slightly higher (3.7%) in 2005. The employment probability of females aged 
25 and younger, with other variables held constant, was 8.2 % lower than other females in 
2005. The impact of GOVPCT is positive for females on the 1996 sample and for males on 
the 2005 sample; however, this impact is negative for females on the 2005 sample. 
Consequently, steps taken with regard to increasing the education level of females, 
implementing policies for increasing the employment probability of females aged 25 and 
younger, and increasing the employment probability of females in the government sector
9 
may reduce the employment probability gap between females and males.   
Johnson (1983) and Mohanty (1998) demonstrated that the gap between female and 
male unemployment rates has disappeared in the United States. Mohanty (1998) explained 
that although the reason for such a change in employers’ attitudes towards females is not 
clear, it may partly be attributed to the implementation of the Civil Rights Act in the 1960s 
and 1970s. According to the above explanation, this Act will play an important role in 
reducing employment probability difference between females and males, by strengthening 
the effectiveness of the labor law and constituting expert anti-discrimination law in China. 
 
 
5. Some Concluding Remarks 
 
By referring to Johnson (1983) and Mohanty (1998), we empirically analyzed 
whether employers discriminated between males and females when hiring employees in 
1996—the year after the labor law was passed and when state enterprise reform gained 
momentum—and in 2005, a decade after the enactment of the labor law. Empirical results 
reveal the prevalence of hiring discrimination between male and female workers both in 
1996 and in 2005. However, the 1996 sample suggests that male workers generally receive 
less favorable treatment and consequently enjoy a lower average employment probability 
than female workers; whereas, the 2005 sample reveals that male workers generally enjoy 
preferential treatment over female workers with otherwise identical worker characteristics. 
Then, we suggested that an increase in the education level of females, in the employment 
probability of females aged 25 and younger, and in the employment probability of females 
in the government sector may prove effective in eliminating employment discrimination 
between males and females.   
    
 
  
                                                   
9  Based on the China Employment Discrimination Survey Questionnaire Report, 32% respondents 
(females) encountered discrimination while civil servants invited applications for a job.   8
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Figure 1. The composition of employment in urban units by gender and the employment 









































total males females femalpct govpct servpct
 
Data source: Authors complied based on the China Labour Statistical Book 2006. 
Note: 1. total, males, females, femalpct, govpct and servpct denote total employment, male employment, 
female employment, the share of female employment in urban units, the employment 
percentage in government sector and the employment percentage in service sector in urban, 
respectively. 
          2. The data of female employment in urban units in 1998 is missing.   11
Table 1: Definition of Variables   
 
Variable  Definition 
  
GRADE  Years of schooling completed 
EXP  AGE- GRADE -5 
YOUNG  1, if age≤25 years; and 0, if otherwise 
FAMINC  Income of other family members (in thousands of RMB) 
MARRIED  1, if the worker is married; and 0, if otherwise 
URATE  City registration unemployment rate of each province 
GOVPCT  Province employment percentage in government sector 
SERVPCT  Province employment percentage in service sector 
EAST  1, if the worker is belongs to Jiangsu or Shandong; and 0, if otherwise 





   
EMP  1, if the worker is currently employed; and 0, if otherwise 
 
   12
Table 2: Means and Standard Deviations of Variables 
 
Variables 
 1996  2005 
  Males Females  Males Females 
          
GRADE   10.3218  9.9110  11.0467  11.4959 
   (3.1092)  (3.1357)  (2.9991)  （2.9994） 
EXP    21.6197 19.4833  23.6734 20.3240 
    (11.6432) (10.5255)  (11.6286)  （10.3623） 
YOUNG    0.1888 0.2178  0.1298 0.1479 
    (0.3916) (0.4131)  (0.3362)  （0.3552） 
FAMINC     7.3190 8.6926  8.5210  13.4935 
    (9.5156) (11.2406)  (11.8436)  （18.2498） 
MARRIED    0.7606 0.7965  0.8170 0.8322 
    (0.4270) (0.4029)  (0.3868)  （0.3738） 
URATE    2.8467 2.8291  5.0298 5.0548 
    (0.6087) (0.6132)  (1.6269)  （1.6439） 
GOVPCT    64.7917 64.9023  52.3667 52.1151 
    (4.5302) (4.4496)  (17.0809)  （17.5605） 
SERVPCT     23.9484 23.8487  32.6545 32.7696 
    (3.6700) (3.6092)  (5.6659)  （5.5554） 
EAST    0.3271 0.3196  0.1639 0.1942 
    (0.4695) (0.4667)  (0.3703)  （0.3958） 
CNTRCITY   0.4947  0.5040  0.3678  0.3579 
   (0.5003) (0.5004)  (0.4824)  （0.4796） 
        
Dependent 
variable 
        
EMP    0.9269 0.9380  0.8487  0.82893 
   (0.2605)  (0.2414)  (0.3585)  （0.37673） 
        
Sample size   752  629  1672  1210 
        
 
Notes: Quantities in parenthesis are standard deviations.   13
Table 3: Probit Estimates of Male and Female Hiring Equations 
 
Variables 
1996   2005 
Male   Female Male   Female 
              
CONSTANT   –6.9903 *  –7.0638 *  –3.7287 *** –1.7236  ***
   (–1.8715)   (–1.9249)   (–7.9888)   (–3.2253)   
GRADE   0.1722 ***  0.1319 *** 0.1738 *** 0.1820  ***
   (4.8204)   (3.4634)   (9.0406)   (9.0289)   
EXP    0.0395 ** 0.0393 ** 0.0375 *** 0.0257  ***
    (2.5920)  (2.4368)  (5.9040)  (3.4131)   
YOUNG    –0.1318  –0.3104  –0.1654  –0.4017  ** 
    (–0.4496)  (–0.9477)  (–0.9821)  (–2.1376)   
FAMINC     –0.0035  0.0083  0.0289 *** 0.0097  ** 
    (–0.5013)  (0.7818)  (4.8903)  (2.5516)   
MARRIED    0.5362 * –0.1994   0.5225 *** 0.4266  ** 
    (1.8823)  (–0.6938)   (3.5211)   (2.5449)   
URATE    –0.1427  –0.1989  –0.0958  –0.0702   
    (–0.8067)  (–1.2217)  (–1.2689)   （–0.7496)   
GOVPCT    0.0706 * 0.0824 **  0.0110 **  –0.0126  ** 
    (1.8349)  (2.1363)  (2.2012)   (–2.0588)   
SERVPCT     0.0639 * 0.0781 **  0.0457 *** 0.0228   
    (1.6871)  (2.0086)  (3.1901)  (1.2377)   
EAST    1.2953 *** 1.0500 *** 0.6242 *** –0.0986   
    (3.3207)  (3.0096)  (4.2333)   (–0.6365)   
CNTRCITY   –0.3209 *  –0.0675   –0.1279   0.3642  ***
    (–1.8511)  (–0.3789)  (–1.3239)   (3.1015)   
Sample size   752  629 1672 1210 
Log 
likelihood   –137.853  –121.114 –511.053 –446.587 
 Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios. 
* shows that variables are significant at a 10 percent level. 
** shows that variables are significant at a 5 percent level. 
*** shows that variables are significant at a 1 percent level.   14
 
Table 4: Male and Female Employment Probabilities Estimated Separately with Male and 
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( ) ( )
M F X β Φ  
(iv) 
A. The 1996 
sample 
 
0.9269      
（0.1211） 
 
0.9383      
（0.0808） 
 
0.9485      
（0.0737） 
 
0.9199      
（0.1236） 
B. The 2005 
sample 
 
0.8484     
（0.1864） 
 
0.8291     
（0.1667） 
 
0.8167      
（0.1724） 
 
0.8692     
（0.1704） 
 
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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2 D  
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F β  
 
M β  
 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios. 
) ( ) ( 1
F M M M X X D β β Φ − Φ =  and  ) ( ) ( 2
F F M F X X D β β Φ − Φ = . 
*** shows that variables are significant at a 1 percent level. 
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Table 6: Changes in Employment Probabilities of Males and Females as a Result of Small 





  1996  2005 








         
GRADE    0.0172 0.0134  0.0295 0.0370 
         
EXP    0.0039 0.0040  0.0064 0.0052 
         
YOUNG    –0.0132 –0.0316  –0.0280 –0.0817 
         
FAMINC     –0.0003 0.0008  0.0049  0.0020 
         
MARRIED    0.0535 –0.0203  0.0886  0.0867 
         
URATE    –0.0142 –0.0203  –0.0162 –0.0143 
         
GOVPCT    0.0070 0.0084  0.0019  –0.0025 
         
SERVPCT     0.0064 0.0080  0.0077 0.0046 
         
EAST    0.1292 0.1069  0.1058  –0.0200 
         
CNTRCITY    –0.0320 –0.0069  –0.0217  0.0740 
         
                                  
  
 